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Hooding the Jury
By JONATHAN BRIDGES*

IN THIS COUNTRY today, an individual may be sentenced to death
without anyone ever deciding to impose that punishment. How can
this be? It can happen because our legal system functions in a way that
divides and dilutes the responsibility for making sentencing decisions.
We have somehow allowed the sum of the component parts in this
decision-making process to equal less than the whole of the decision.
Our tolerance of such a system is shameful. It is the jury component of
this system that is most suspect. Although in some states the jury's role
is advisory,' in most states juries ultimately decide the appropriateness
of capital punishment given the circumstances of the case. On this
question, their decision is final. Yet on occasion some prosecutors invite juries to pass on part of their responsibility, encouraging them
instead to rely on a reviewing court or another decision-maker to
make the correct determination should they get it wrong.
Traditionally, executioners have avoided responsibility in a similar manner. Rituals like wearing a hood serve to insulate them from
the weight of the responsibility of taking a human life. In this context,
such protections may be appropriate and necessary. It is inappropriate
for prosecutors to provide that type of protection for juries in capital
cases by de-emphasizing their roles in death sentence decisions, by
making them feel less responsible for sentence determinations, and by
inviting them to pass on what responsibility they do feel to trial judges,
appellate courts, or others in the system. Inviting juries to "pass the
buck" to the court is inappropriate because those to whom it is passed
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may not assume the responsibility either. They may be institutionally
incapable of making the kind of decisions the juries have passed
upon, or they may defer to what they believe to be a jury decision
when in fact that decision constitutes little more than an abdication of
responsibility. Surely capital sentences based on such a dysfunctional
process violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee.
But currently, they are withstanding constitutional challenge.
The United States Supreme Court's attempts to deal with this issue under the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause are misguided and have created an unworkable doctrine. Because the issue is procedural, the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment simply does not apply. Thus the Court has held, and
rightly so, that the Eighth Amendment does not prevent a prosecutor
from presenting information that tends to "lessen the jury's sense of
responsibility"2 in capital sentencing proceedings. Yet ajury that does
not feel a sense of responsibility for its decision is incompatible with
the role the jury is asked to play in our legal system. Our system can
function properly only when juries accept responsibility for their
decisions.
This article contends that the minimum requirements of procedural due process demand a death sentence decision-maker who accepts responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the death
penalty and one who feels the full weight of that responsibility. At the
very least, due process demands that juries be encouraged to accept,
not reject, the responsibility that is theirs. To the extent that prosecutors invite sentencing juries to do less, they violate the Fourteenth
2. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 15 (1994) (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment is implicated only when the jury is misled by inaccurate
information that tends to lessen its sense of responsibility). This holding is a departure from
the Court's plurality opinion in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
3. Indeed, the evidence indicates that the death sentencing system is not functioning
properly. See RICHARD L. FALLON ET AL., HART & WESCHLER'S FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1364 (4th ed. 1996); id at 165 (Supp. 1999) (stating that "past studies have
found that capital [habeas] petitioners obtained relief in roughly 40% of cases (compared
to a 1-3% success rate overall)"). See also James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error
Rates in Capital Cases 1973-1995, availableat http://www.law.columbia.edu/news/PressReleases/liebman.html (stating that "[n]ationally, during the 23-year study period, the overall rate of prejudicial error in the American capital punishment system was 68%").
Governor Ryan of Illinois drew similar conclusions about the system, leading him to declare a moratorium on executions in his state. See Press Release, Governor George H. Ryan,
Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on Executions, Will Appoint Commission to Review Capital
Punishment System (Jan. 31, 2000), available at http://www.state.il.us/gov/press/00/Jan/
morat.htm.

Summer 2001 ]

JURIES IN CAPITAL CASES

Amendment by encouraging proceedings that are fundamentally
unfair.
In Part I, this Article compares the role played by capital sentencing juries with the role of the executioner-emphasizing the similarities between the symbolism of the executioner's hood and our efforts
to insulate sentencing juries from the weight and finality of a death
5
4
sentence. Part II explains how Furman v. Georgia, Gregg v. Georgia,
and McGautha v. California took judicial review of capital sentencing
off track by pretending that questions of legal process were addressed
by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. This article concludes that this misuse of the Eighth Amendment (along with a corresponding failure to apply the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause 7 to resolve what is best described as
a procedural question) is responsible for the current state of the law.
Part III then makes the case for applying due process.

I. Hooding
It should come as no surprise that society tends to shelter juries
from the responsibility they bear in the death sentencing process. The
same was always done for executioners. In fact, we have developed
elaborate rituals aimed at protecting executioners from the full weight
and impact of their responsibility for the deaths of others. Considerable effort goes into maintaining these rituals in order to soften the
harshness of the task of the execution. This section describes the effort to protect executioners from the weight of their responsibility and
compares it to similar attempts to protect juries in death sentence de4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
6. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
7. See generally Beth S. Brinkmann, Note, The Presumption of Life: A StartingPoint for a
Due Process Analysis of Capital Sentencing, 94 YALE L.J. 351 (1984). Brinkmann blames the
Court for this problem:
The Court has not adequately analyzed the impact of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment on capital sentencing systems. Because of its text and
history, the due process clause provides better authority for establishing the minimal procedures that should underlie all capital sentencing proceedings than does
the Eighth Amendment. By refusing to rely upon the due process clause, the
Court has permitted states to develop capital sentencing schemes that disregard
the fundamental values of our system of criminal procedure.
Id. at 352. Timing, however, may also be to blame. See id. at 361-62 (stating that "[t]he
failure of capital punishment jurisprudence to focus on the due process clauses [of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], and to rely instead upon the Eighth Amendment, is
largely a result of the sequence in which particular cases reached the Supreme Court").
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liberations. The section concludes by assessing the appropriateness of
such protections in the context of the death sentencing process.
A.

Protecting Executioners
"I am one of a very small brotherhood," former prison warden

Donald Cabana wrote in 1994.8 "There are probably a dozen other

people in the United States since 1976 who, like me, have been called
upon to carry out the supposed mandate of the American people to
execute convicted felons." 9 He describes his experience:
The first time I had to execute a prisoner ... I continued to in-

dulge in self-denial right up until 12:01 a.m. I didn't believe it
would happen, and I know he did not believe it either. I can still
recall it, because technically in our ritualistic execution process,
the executioner cannot proceed until he receives a final telephone
call from the attorney general and governor telling him that all
obstacles have been cleared. When that telephone rings, it has a far
different sound for the prisoner who is strapped in the chair than
it does for the warden. Our eyes locked on each other, and all I
could do was shake my head, indicating that the execution would
proceed.'
Warden Lawrence Wilson provides another personal account
from the executioner's perspective. In 1987 he testified in a Los Angeles capital trial, describing his participation in the execution
procedures:
At the stated time, the warden gives the command to begin the
execution. Doctors are standing by with stethoscopes on the inmate's heart, and they're monitoring his life as the execution takes
place. It takes about ten, maybe twelve minutes before it's over.
It's a really ugly way of taking a fellow's life. It's really bad...
and it rubs off on the people who are responsible for carrying out
the law.
I know many states contract for this detail to be done. Nonprison people come in who are executioners. They do their job
and fold up their satchel and away they go afterwards. But California law reads so that the warden is responsible and carries out the
mandate of the penal code. My staff members, like the chaplain
and the doctors, and I are all there, we each have a certain thing to
8. See Donald Cabana, An Executioner's Perspective, 22 Am.J. CRIM. L. 287, 287 (1994).
9. Id. It is unclear why Warden Cabana would believe there are so few individuals
who have performed executions in our nation's recent history. Twenty states have carried
out death sentences since 1999. SeeJohn Harwood, Bush May Be Hurt by Handling of DeathPenalty Issue, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2000, at A28. Even in 1994 when his comments were
published, well more than a dozen states performed executions. See id.
10. Cabana, supra note 8, at 289.
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do, and we conduct the business. We don't have hoods on or robes
like some states. 1
Warden Cabana and Warden Wilson share in common an unusual thing for executioners-they were not sheltered from feeling the
weight and responsibility of their tasks. More typical is the procedure
described by William Leeke, former head of Corrections in South
Carolina:
Our procedure was that the identity of the individuals who performed the execution was known only to me and the deputy commissioner for operations. We would meet personally with them and
inquire as to why they would be willing to do it, looking to see if
they were emotionally stable, why they would want to be involved in
having the responsibility of pushing the buttons that set the electrocution in progress. They would go into the death house, Capital
Punishment Facility, I think we called it, to make it sound more
humane, but most people still call it the "death house," dressed in
ponchos, covering their heads, prior to everybody else's getting
there to protect their identity. They remain in the death house
chamber, where the buttons that control the electric chair are located, and are brought
out after everyone else leaves, again to pro12
tect their identities.
Most executioners are similarly insulated from the brunt of the
job. Many states protect the identity of executioners by statute. 14 To
help maintain confidentiality, states frequently pay executioners in
cash-recently $500 per execution in New Jersey and New York; while
a meager $150 is the going rate in Florida. 15 Florida goes even further,
prohibiting its employees in some cases from even acknowledging
16
whether they have attended an execution.
13

11. Interview with Warden Lawrence Wilson, former Warden of San Quentin, Where
the Bodies Meet the Road, in A PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME, AMERICANS SPEAK OUT
AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY

121-22 (Ian Gray & Moira Stanley eds., 1989) (Aug. 18,1982)

(describing death in the gas chamber).
12. Interview with William D. Leeke, former Head of Corrections for the State of

South Carolina, Behind Closed Doors, in A
SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY,

13. See

ROBERT JAY LIFrON

& GREG

PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME, AMERICANS

supra note 11, at 113-14.
MITCHELL, WHO OWNS DEATH?

86-89 (2000).

14. See John D. Bessler, The "Midnight Assassination Law" and Minnesota's Anti-Death
Penalty Movement, 1849-1911, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 577, 710 n.929 (1996) (citing Florida, Illinois, Montana, New Jersey, and New York statutes as examples).
15. See Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution an UnconstitutionalMethod of Execution? The
Engineeringof Death over the Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551, 655 n.705 (1994) (addressing Florida and New Jersey practices); Richard Klein, Constitutional Concerns About Capital
Punishment: The Death Penalty Statute in New York State, I1 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 1, 31 (1996)
(addressing New York's practice). Perhaps Florida's use of the electric chair and the use of
lethal injection in New York and New Jersey explain this discrepancy in pay.
16. See Roderick C. Patrick, Note, HidingDeath, 18 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT

117, 144 (1992).
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But confidentiality is not enough. Many states also provide for
anonymity in some manner-so that the executioners themselves do
not know who it is doing the actual killing. In Utah, where the firing
squad is still in use, one member of the squad is given a blank rather
than a bullet to load in his rifle. None of the squad members know
which of them is firing the blank, and thus each may be comforted by
the possibility that he did not cause the condemned's death.17 States
that rely on lethal injection may hide the multiple executioners behind a screen and one button may activate a syringe filled with a
harmless chemical.' States utilizing the electric chair often rely similarly on "extra" buttons to dissipate the moral burden.' 9 At one point,
even automatic gallows were in use. 20 They were designed to trigger
the drop by the condemned's own body weight, allowing for a hang2
ing without a hangman. '
Perhaps the most intriguing of the symbols of anonymity is the
executioner's hood. It has been upgraded recently, in many states, to
venetian blinds on the death chamber windows,2 2 a white screen between the gallows and the witnesses,2 3 a canvas wall behind which the
firing squad shoots, 24 or even a hood placed on the condemned's own
head. 2 5 But the old fashioned hood is still in use in Florida. 26

These rituals, aimed at protecting the anonymity of the executioner, have a practical purpose. They make killing easier-both easier to do and easier to live with. One commentator states that "rituals,
like the hood of the hangman, serve to dehumanize the guards and
executioners, and enable them to respect themselves even though
17.

See id.at 143.

18.

See id.

19.

See id.

20.

SeeJOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK 150 (1997).

21.

See id.

22. See Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L.
REv. 319, 433 (1997).
23. SeeJohn P. Rutledge, The Definitive Inhumanity of Capital Punishment, 20 Wi IIYrIER
L. REV. 283, 294 (1998).
24.

See id.at 295.

25.

See NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG 985 (1979). While a hood on the

condemned's head does not provide anonymity from the perspective of onlookers, the
only onlookers who are present or who are close enough to tell the identity of the executioner may be the other participants in the execution process. Thus, covering the condemned's head may provide as much anonymity as hooding the executioner. Plus, it may
have the additional effect of making the condemned appear a little less human. Id.
26. See Patrick, supra note 16, at 143.
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27
their employment involves destroying other human beings." Another commentator describes the work of C. Paul Phelps, the designer
of Louisiana's execution process:
Phelps deliberately designed the execution procedures with the
aim of ensuring that Department of Corrections personnel would
not have to take any personal responsibility. For example, under
Phelps' procedure, the executioner was anonymous. Commissioner Phelps intended executions to be "like a drill, like an exerhe himself would never attend an execution "in a million
cise," and
28
years."
This commentator concludes that "[flar too many people [have]
severed their 'personal values from their public duties' [and that] the
Nuremberg defense has been accepted as a proper mode of behavior
by many of those responsible for our criminal justice system. '2 9 Exwarden James Park agrees:
"Capital punishment" is a sanitized expression, "execution" is sanitized-it's something other people do. That's why I use the word
"kill" and try to personalize it. Every citizen in California is killing
and it's a personal thing and yet they don't take it personally, and I
think that rather few of the people that agitate for the death penalty would be willing to actually do the killing. They would have
concerns if they had to do it. Right now it's kind of a
some major
30
charade.
The botched execution of Charles Walker in Illinois in 1990 illustrates Park's point. Though Illinois relies on lethal injection, the
"kinder" method of execution, "[t]here was some indication [at his
execution] that the first chemical may have worn off before Walker
became unconscious." 3 1 Two mistakes in the process were apparently
to blame. "First, a kink developed in the intravenous line," slowing the
flow and effects of the chemical injections.3 2 Second, the intravenous
needle was "improperly" inserted "so that the chemicals flowed toward

27.

Daniel P. Blank, Book Note, Mumia Abu-Jamal and the "Death Row Phenomenon, "48

STAN. L. REV. 1625, 1649 (1996)

(reviewing MUMIA ABU-JAMAL, LIVE FROM DEATH Row

(1995)).
28. Ronald J. Tabak, Dead Man Walking-An Eyewitness Account of the Death Penalty in the
United States, 12 N.Y.L. Scii. J. HUM. RTs. 243, 250 (1994) (book review). Some states go so
far as to put in place "stress inoculation programs" for prison staff members "suffering
from posttraumatic stress disorder after an execution." BESSLER, supra note 20, at 147.
29. Tabak, supra note 28, at 251. 'lust following orders" as a defense has been rejected
almost universally. See Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg: Forty Five Years Later, 7 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 1, 55 (1991).
30. Interview with James W.L. Park, Former Associate Warden, Amazing Grace, in A
PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME, AMERICANS SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY,

supra note 11, at 131 (recording the author's interview with the editors).
31. Denno, supra note 22, at 433.
32. Id.
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Walker's fingertips instead of his heart." 33 Apparently, corrections officials closed the blinds to the execution room (where Walker died
alone) in order to cover these blunders and to conceal the extended
34
period of time it took for him to die.

Executions like this are easier to stomach behind blinds. Executioners, as well as witnesses, are shielded from the fact that executions
do (at least on occasion) cause extreme suffering. The weight of and
responsibility for that suffering is lessened because no one has to face
the sufferer. Indeed, if no one sees the suffering, it is easier to denyif only to ourselves.
B.

Protecting Juries

Juries are different from executioners, different in a way that
makes hooding inappropriate. Executioners are asked to act almost
mechanically, without feeling or thought. Their job is ministerial. But
not so with juries. We ask juries to decide. That is their role. Trying to
protect them from the responsibility for deciding takes away from the
very role they serve. Hooding ajury in the death penalty context is not
like hooding the executioner, for the executioner is able to perform
his task wearing the hood. Hooding a jury is more like blindfolding
the firing squad and then asking it to perform its duty. We simply
cannot protect juries from responsibility as we do executioners and
still expect them to be able to do their job.
1. Death in the Dark
In a recent book entitled Death in the Dark,35 John Bessler complains that attempts to avoid personal responsibility have affected the
entire death penalty process.3 6 He describes what he calls the "shell
game of moral responsibility" as follows: "Legislators who pass death
penalty statutes just authorize capital punishment; it is prosecutors
who seek death sentences, and judges and juries who impose them.
Conversely, prosecutors,judges, and juries just carry out death penalty
statutes as enacted by legislators." 37 Bessler continues, "[e]ven governors who refuse to grant clemency requests can sidestep responsibility
for executions by taking the position that they are simply deferring to
33.
34.

Id.
See id.

35.

BESSLER, supra note 20.

36.
37.

See id. at 150.
Id. at 147.
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judicial determinations."3 8 Bessler does not contend that all of them
(legislators, prosecutors, governors, judges, and juries) must accept
moral responsibility; rather, it seems, he is concerned that none of
them is willing to accept moral responsibility for the decision.
Most frightening to Bessler is the proposition that the condemned may face death without anyone ever making the determination that he should die. 39 "Personal responsibility for executions is
particularly hard to pinpoint," he explains, "because elected officials,
judges, and jurors are not required to pull the lever that actuates an
execution. Indeed, each actor in the criminal justice system usually
points to another actor as the most responsible agent for executions." 40 Bessler describes how the perceived lack of responsibility is
especially problematic for juries:
J] urors are .. .aware that all death sentences will be reviewed by
several appellate courts, further diffusing personal responsibility.
The Capital Jury Project,[41] an ongoing fourteen-state study of
how jurors make life and death sentencing decisions, actually
found that over 30 percent ofjurors in capital cases described "the
law" as the most responsible agent for the defendant's punishment.
In contrast, only 6.4 percent ofjurors believed that they were [individually] the most responsible agent for the punishment, and only
8.8 percent believed that the jury as a body was the most responsible agent. The study found that three-fourths of jurors "saw themselves as sharing responsibility with the judicial authorities, because
their decision may be overturned, because it will be reviewed, or
because it is only the first 42
step in a process that will determine the
defendant's punishment."
The concept of shared responsibility is not so frightening if there
is some assurance that the authorizing jurors whom they believe they
are sharing responsibility with are willing to accept their share. There
is no reason to believe that juries alone should bear the responsibility
for sentencing. But there is also no reason to believe that responsibility is being shared appropriately. Rather, it seems likely thatjuries frequently relinquish far more responsibility than is accepted by trial
judges, appellate courts, or anyone else.
38. Id. at 149.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 147-48. In the limited context of statutory divided capital sentencing procedures in which judges and juries share sentencing duties, Michael A. Mello expresses a
similar concern that "both judge and jury may take comfort in the knowledge that neither is
ultimately, fully responsible for the fate of a defendant." Mello, supra note 1, at 315.
41. For a discussion of the project, see William J. Bowers, The CapitalJuy Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995).
42. BESSLER, supra note 20, at 148 (quoting Bowers, supra note 41, at 1094-97).
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Bessler points out that prosecutors sometimes try to diminish the
sense of personal responsibility that capital sentencing juries may
44
feel. 43 He lists as an example a recent Alabama case, Taylor v. State,
in which the prosecutor argued,
Don't [let] anybody getting up here [give] you the idea that you're
sending somebody to their death, that you're killing anybody.
You're not. Don't let anybody try to put a guilt trip on you or anything like that .... [Y]ou're not going to kill anybody. Nobody is
asking you to do that. Nobody is walking
up and saying, "Here's the
45
switch, pull it." Nothing like that.
To the extent such arguments are allowed by trial judges, they
invite jurors to insulate themselves from the moral impact of their decisions. Just as the hood protects the executioner from the full weight
and responsibility of his part in the process, such suggestions make it
easier-too easy perhaps-for jurors to sentence an individual to
death.

2.

Prosecutors' Arguments

Prosecutors often attempt to make juries more comfortable with
the idea of imposing a death sentence. Diminishing the jury's sense of
responsibility for the sentence is just one way of reaching that level of
comfort. For example, at the sentencing phase of a capital trial a
Georgia jury was asked,
[H]ow did we get to right here? You got here because the district
attorney, that's me, as the agent of the State made the decision to
seek the death penalty in this case. Not any of you all but by law the
only person who can do that. So you didn't bring us here. No one
else did. That was my decision and that's why you can choose not
to impose the death penalty if you want to, for any reason or no
reason whatsoever. But that decision seeking the death penalty was
already made. So don't feel like it is yours and
have it weigh too
46
heavily on you because that was my decision.
Later, in closing remarks, the prosecutor added, "[y]ou are simply one more step in the procedure. '47 The jury returned a sentence
of death, which was upheld on appeal.
Similar examples are readily available. In one Louisiana case, the
prosecutor explained,
43.
44.
1995).
45.
46.
denial)
47.

See BESSLER, supra note 20, at 148.
Taylor v. State, 666 So. 2d 36 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994), affd, 666 So. 2d 73 (Ala.
Taylor, 666 So. 2d at 48-50.
Lipham v. Georgia, 488 U.S. 873, 874 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting from cert.
(citation omitted).
Id
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[I] t's a tough thing to ask, but there is only one penalty really available for this type of crime and that is the death penalty. This is
where it will begin. From the next point forward it goes through
the court system to be thoroughly reviewed and checked, through
every court
in this land. But it has to begin here, right here with
48
the jury.
Another Louisiana jury was told,
Though it's difficult to stand before you ladies and gentlemen
and ask you to consider imposing upon anyone the penalty of
death, but in order to make your task easier, we'll state for you that
first of all, you have a solemn obligation to live up to your oath.
Second of all, that whatever you decide will be recommendationsand recommendations to the Judge, for the Judge to impose the
death penalty. It will be the Judge that sentences this defendant49to
whatever the sentence might be. You make recommendations.
Likewise, a prosecutor informed a South Carolina jury that
[Tlhere are many safeguards built into this law. There are many
many guidelines, safeguards for the defendant's benefit. And I
have no problems with that. I agree with that. I want it that way.
We are talking about the ultimate punishment. There are even
safeguards that I can't tell you about because the law says I am not suppose
[sic] to tell you about
them, and I have no problems with that. I am
50

glad it is that way.

51
In each of these cases, the defendant was sentenced to death.
Also in each of these cases, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 52 Justice Marshall dissented on each denial of certiorari
based on Caldwell v. Mississippi,5 3 a 1985 opinion he authored for a
plurality of the Court.

48. Moore v. Blackburn, 476 U.S. 1176, 1176 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
cert. denial) (citation omitted).
49. Busby v. Louisiana, 474 U.S. 873, 873-74 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
cert. denial) (quoting Busby v. State, 464 So. 2d 262, 266 (La. 1985)).
50. South v. South Carolina, 474 U.S. 888, 889 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
cert. denial) (citation omitted).
51. See Lipham, 488 U.S. at 873; Moore, 476 U.S. at 1176; Busby, 474 U.S. at 873; South,
474 U.S. at 878.
52. See Lipham, 488 U.S. at 873; Moore, 476 U.S. at 1176; Busby, 474 U.S. at 873; South,
474 U.S. at 878.
53.

472 U.S. 320 (1985). For a practitioner's analysis of Caldwell, see Dennis N. Balske,

Putting It All Together: The Penalty-PhaseClosing Argument, in 3

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LITIGAT-

275 (Margery B. Koosed ed., 1996); Margery B. Koosed, Prosecutorial
Misconduct in the Penalty Phase Closing Argument-The Improper Invitation to Kill (Part I & II),
in 3 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra, at 282; Craig Haney et al., Deciding to Take a Life: Capital
Juries, Sentencing Instructions, and the Jurisprudenceof Death, in 3 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra,
at 291.
ING CAPITAL CASES
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Caldwell v. Mississippi

In Caldwell, a Mississippi prosecutor addressed a sentencing jury
regarding its responsibility for the sentencing:
Now, they [the defense attorneys] would have you believe that
you're going to kill this man and they know-they know that your
decision is not the final decision. My God, how unfair can you be?
Your job is reviewable .... They said "Thou shalt not kill." If that
applies to him, it applies to you, insinuating that your decision is
the final decision and that they're gonna take Bobby Caldwell out
in the front of this Courthouse in moments and string him up and
that is terribly, terribly unfair. For they know, as I know, and as
Judge Baker has told you, that the decision you render is automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court. Automatically,
and I think
54
it's unfair and I don't mind telling them so.
The jury sentenced Bobby Caldwell to death, and the Mississippi Su55
preme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence.
The United States Supreme Court reversed this decision. Justice
Marshall's plurality opinion concluded "it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for
determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere." 56 Relying on the Eighth Amendment's implicit requirement
of reliability5 7 and the doctrinal view that death is different, Justice
Marshall stated that the Court "has taken as a given that capital
sentencers would view their task as the serious one of determining
whether a specific human being should die at the hands of the
State."5 8 He continued, listing four "specific reasons" the Court
should be wary of capital sentences "when there are state-induced suggestions that the sentencing jury may shift its sense of responsibility to
an appellate court[:]" 59 (1) institutional limits on the scope of appellate review may prevent a "fair determination of the appropriateness
of [the defendant's] death;" (2) a jury might impose the death sentence in order to "send a message"-knowing its error can be cor54. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 325-26 (citations omitted).
55. See Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806, 815 (Miss. 1983).
56. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29.
57. The Court discusses the "Eighth Amendment's 'need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."' Id. at 330 (quoting
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)). In Woodson,
however, the plurality opinion relied on both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,
and it pointed to procedural inadequacies as the source of the constitutional infirmities.
See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 n.40.
58. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329.
59. Id. at 330.
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rected; (3) a jury may be influenced to choose the death penalty for
the purpose of invoking appellate review of its appropriatenessknowing that sentences short of death cannot be increased; and (4) it
may be very attractive to a jury to defer its role to the appellate
courts. 60

Justice Marshall concluded that the prosecutor's statements concerning appellate review were neither accurate nor relevant to sentencing. 6 1 But his plurality opinion asserted further that such
information should never be admissible-even if accurate and relevant-because it impermissibly tends to "lessen the jury's sense of responsibility. '6 2 Justice O'Connor's deciding vote conceded that the
prosecutor's statements were inaccurate, but not that they were irrelevant. 63 She explained,
[T] he prosecutor's remarks were impermissible because they were
[1] inaccurate and [2] misleading in a manner that diminished the
jury's sense of responsibility.
Should a state conclude that the reliability for its sentencing
procedure is enhanced by accurately instructing the jurors on the
sentencing procedure, including the existence and limited nature
of appellate review, I see64nothing ...to foreclose a policy choice in
favor of jury education.

Thus Justice O'Connor's opinion rests on narrower grounds: the
statements were impermissible because they lessened the jury's sense
of responsibility and they were inaccurate. 65 Her position is that prose60. See id.at 330-33.
61. See id. at 336-37. The requirement that information given to a jury in death penalty sentencing must be "accurate" and "relevant" comes from the Court's decision in Ramos v. California,463 U.S. 992, 1001-06 (1983).
62. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 15 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,concurring)
(describing Justice O'Connor's disagreement with the plurality in Caldwell).
63. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 342 (O'Connor, J.,concurring). Justice O'Connor
pointed out that:
[U]nder Mississippi law the reviewing court applies a "presumption of correctness" to the sentencing jury's verdict. The jury's verdict of death may be overturned only if so arbitrary that it "was against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence," or if the evidence of statutory aggravating circumstances is so lacking
that a judge "should have entered a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the
verdict."
Id. at 343 (quoting Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806, 817 (Miss. 1983) (Lee, J., dissenting)).
See also Williams v. State, 445 So. 2d 798, 811 (Miss. 1984).
64. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 342.
65. Justice O'Connor's concurrence does not explain on what grounds she found the
prosecutor's statements inaccurate. Implicitly, however, her opinion seems to agree with
the plurality's position that "[t ] he argument was inaccurate, both because it was misleading
as to the nature of the appellate court's review and because it depicted the jury's role in a
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cutors' statements concerning appellate review are inadmissible only
when they are inaccurate. It appears, however, that she did not mean
inaccuracy in a strict sense-because in a strict sense, the prosecutor's
statements in this case were accurate. The jury's decision was not "final." But by acknowledging that states can choose to instruct 'Jurors
on [death] sentencing procedure, including the existence and limited
nature of appellate review," 66 justice O'Connor implied that telling less
than the whole story may sometimes constitute Caldwell inaccuracy.
Justice Rehnquist wrote for a three Justice dissent, concluding
"that it is highly unlikely that the jury's sense of responsibility was diminished."6 7 He emphasized that the prosecutor's argument, as a
whole, contended "that the jury was not solely responsible for [the]
sentence"-not that it had no responsibility in the matter. 68 In his assessment, the prosecutor's behavior, while less than exemplary, did
69
not rise to the level of constitutional significance.
4.

iUmiting Caldwell

Chief Justice Rehnquist has since written for the majority of the
Court on the issue of jury responsibility for death penalty sentences.
In Romano v. Oklahoma,70 the petitioner was sentenced to death twice,
in two separate trials, for two separate crimes. At the sentencing stage
of the second trial, his first conviction and death sentence were admitted into evidence. 71 Thus it must have appeared to the jury that it was
sentencing a man already condemned. But after the second sentence,
the first conviction and sentence were overturned on appeal. 72 Based
on Caldwell, the petitioner asserted that "admission of the evidence
regarding his prior death sentence undermined the [second] jury's
sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
death penalty, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
'73
Amendments.
way fundamentally at odds with the role that a capital sentencer must perform." Id. at 336.
Or perhaps she agreed only with the first of these grounds.
66. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 350 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 348.
69. See id. at 351.
70. 512 U.S. 1 (1994).
71. See id at 3.
72. See id. at 6.
73. Id. at 3. Although the prosecutor made no Caldwelltype remarks in this case, the
admission of evidence concerning the first death sentence has a similar effect in that it
tends to alleviate the jury's sense of responsibility.
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But the Court declined to apply Caldwell in this instance. Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained,
As Justice O'Connor supplied the fifth vote in Caldwell, and
concurred on grounds narrower than those put forth by the plurality, her position is controlling. Accordingly, we have since read
Caldwell as "relevant only to certain types of comment-those that
mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that
allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision." Thus, "to establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly
74
described the role assigned to the jury by local law."

It is not clear, however, that Chief Justice Rehnquist's conclusion
follows from his characterization of the Caldwell holding. It may be
that a proper (that is, accurate) description of the jury's role may
nonetheless mislead the jury about the weight of its responsibility. For
example, because the scope of appellate review is quite complicated, it

may be impossible to inform jurors of the appeals process without misleading them about what precisely can be reviewed. It appears that
such was the case in Caldwell itself. Chief Justice Rehnquist's position,
however, appears to allow the admission of technically accurate yet
misleading information, even if it tends to diminish the jury's sense of
75
responsibility.
Justice O'Connor wrote separately to clarify her position in Caldwell She explained,
I believe that petitioner's Caldwell claim fails, because the evidence
here was accurate at the time it was admitted. Petitioner's sentencingjury was told that he had been sentenced to death-and indeed
he had been. Introducing that evidence is no different than providing the jury with an accurate description of a State's appellate review process. Both may (though we can never know for sure) lessen
the jury's sense of responsibility, but neither is unconstitutional.
Though evidence like that involved in this case can rise to the level
of a Caldwell violation, to do so the evidence must be both inaccurate and tend to undermine the jury's sense of responsibility. 76
Here Justice O'Connor again asserts that undermining the jury's

sense of responsibility is not sufficient to trigger Caldwell. Rather,
Caldwell comes into play only when the jury's sense of responsibility is
undermined by information that is inaccurate. It is plausible to con74. Id. at9 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168,184 n.15 (1986) and Dugger
v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)) (emphasis added).
75. To illustrate, this position perhaps would tolerate informing a jury that a particular appellate court had not upheld a death sentence in 20 years, while failing to mention
that a higher court had regularly reversed many of that court's decisions.
76. Romano, 512 U.S. at 14-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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tend however, that the second jury in this case was told less than the
whole story in a way quite similar to what occurred in Caldwell.77 In
neither case were the juries given information that was technically inaccurate. 78 Calling the evidence "accurate" or "inaccurate" is begging
the question. In both Caldwell and Romano, prosecutors presented the
juries with information that was technically true but nonetheless misleading. 79 In both cases, the information seemed likely to lessen the
juries' sense of responsibility for invoking the death sentence. The
only principled way to reconcile them is to point out what made the
information misleading in Romano (the subsequent overturning of his
first death sentence) was unknown to the prosecutor at the time he
presented it to the jury-while what made the information misleading
in Caldwell (the limited scope of review) was known to the prosecutor
all along. While such a distinction may be appropriate in compiling a
prosecutor's code of conduct, nothing about the prosecutor's state of
mind affects whether a jury has adequately performed its function.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Romano was not the first to
limit the applicability of Caldwell. In Darden v. Wainwright,80 decided
just twelve months after Caldwell,Justice Powell's majority opinion distinguished the Caldwell holding, giving it no more than brief treatment in a footnote. 8 ' Similarly, in Sawyer v. Smith,8 2 the Court refused
to apply Caldwell under the nonretroactivity doctrine of Teague v.
Lane.813 Instead, the Sawyer Court upheld the petitioner's death sentence in spite of comments from the prosecutor as follows:
You are the people that are going to take the initial step and only
the initial step and all you are saying to this court, to the people of
this Parish, to this man, to all the Judges that are going to review
this case after this day, is that you the people do not agree and will
not tolerate an individual to commit such a heinous and atrocious
crime to degrade such a fellow human being without the authority
and the impact, the full authority and impact of the law of
Louisiana.

77. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 331-32.
78. See id. at 342. See also Romano, 512 U.S. at 6-10.
79. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 342. See also Romano, 512 U.S. at 6-10.
80. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
81. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 183 n.15 (1986) (distinguishing Caldwell
on the basis that the improper comments in this case were not approved of by the trial

judge, did not take place during the sentencing phase of the trial, and in any case could
not have misled the jury concerning the significance of its role).
82. 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
83. See id. at 227, 242-43 (1990) (applying Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
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It's all [you are] doing. Don't feel otherwise. Don't feel like
you are the one, because it is very easy for defense lawyers to try
and make each and every one of you feel like you are pulling the
switch. That is not so. It is not so and if you are wrong in your
decision believe me, believe me there will be others who will be
behind you to either agree with you or to say you are
wrong so I ask
84
that you do have the courage of your convictions.
5.

Nonconstitutional Solutions to Caldwell Concerns

Relying on state constitutions, many state courts prohibit Caldwelltype arguments even though the United States Supreme Court has
allowed them. 8 5 Thus, a limited number of states appear as repeat
players before the Court on this issue. 86 The American Bar Association stance on the issue prohibits "[r]eferences to the likelihood that
other authorities, such as the governor or the appellate courts, will
correct an erroneous conviction [because such references] are impermissible efforts to lead the jury to shirk responsibility for its
87
decision.
In Death in the Dark, Bessler recommends a legislative fix-one
that he contends would bring personal responsibility back into the
process. 88 "To restore accountability to America's criminal justice system," he suggests, "no longer can anonymous, black-hooded executioners be permitted to perform executions. Instead, elected
prosecutors who seek death sentences and judges and jurors who
hand them out must be required to pull the switches and levers that
activate execution mechanisms."8 9 This is not mere rhetoric for
Bessler, but rather the natural outgrowth of a "put up or shut up"
philosophy on the death penalty: those who are prepared to invoke
the death penalty "impersonally" should do so only if they are willing
to accept the "personal" consequences of their decisions. In theory, it
is much like the economics of externalities. 90
84. Id. at 231-32 (quoting the trial transcript at 984-85).
85. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 334 nn.4-5 (1984) (collecting state court
cases); Mello, supra note 1, at 305-08.
86. Such prosecutorial statements have been prohibited since Caldwell in many states.
See, e.g., Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1994) (applying the doctrine of Caldwell
under Florida law); Pennsylvania v. Jasper, 737 A.2d 196, 197-98 (Pa. 1999); New Jersey v.
Rose, 548 A.2d 1058, 1087-89 (N.J. 1988).
87. 1 ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-5.8 CMT (2d ed. Supp. 1986).
88. See BESSLER, supra note 20, at 150.
89. Id. at 152.
90. An "externality" is a cost associated with an act that the actor does not have to take
into account in determining the cost-effectiveness of his activities because it is imposed on
someone else. See HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAwYERs 25 (1998). A goal of
law and economics theorists is to internalize externalities-that is, to force the actor to
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Bessler suggests that "legislators who vote for the death penalty or
governors who refuse to commute death sentences" would also make
good candidates for performing executions. 9' In a slightly less extreme proposal, he begs, "[a] t the very least, the judge and jurors who
preside over a capital trial should be required to attend executions, as
they were in New York in the 1840s."92 One student commentator
goes so far as to compare the current role ofjuries in capital sentencing to that of the "execution happy Queen in Alice in Wonderland
[who] told a court officer to 'just take [the Mad Hatter's] head off
outside.' "93 Perhaps simply requiring that all Wonderland beheadings
take place "inside" would address this concern.
C.

The Jury's Role

But to complain that the jury, like the Queen, prefers its beheadings "outside" is to beg the question, isn't it? In other words, to say
that juries do not feel enough responsibility for death penalty decisions fails to address how responsible juries ought to feel for those decisions. And it operates even less to address how responsible the
Constitution requires juries to feel.
In a recent article, Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker suggest that
the entire capital punishment system is regulated in a manner that
serves to legitimize executions "despite the fact that no one 'intended'
it to

.

.

"-94They contend that "Et]he Court's [death penalty] doc-

trine can be said to work as a facade to the extent that it is successful
... at making participants in the criminal justice system and the public at large more comfortable with the death penalty than they otherwise would be or should be." 95 Their argument proceeds,
take account of them. Similarly, a goal for proponents of Bessler's death penalty jurisprudence is to force proponents of the death penalty to face the consequences of imposing
death sentences.
91. BESSLER, supra note 20, at 152.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Heidi Boghosian, Note, DistancingJurorsfrom Death with Death Sentence Evidence, 5
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 99, 99 (1996) (quoting LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN
WONDERLAND).

94. Carol Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades
of ConstitutionalRegulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 437 (1999). See also
Robert Weisberg, DereglatingDeath, 1983 Sup. CT. REV.305 (comparingjury instructions in
capital cases pre and post-Furman and Gregg); Franklin E. Zimring, Inheritingthe Wind: The
Supreme Court and Capital Punishment in the 1990s, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (1992) (suggesting that Supreme Court justices have become the moral guardians of the death
penalty).
95. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 94, at 429.
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First, the Court's focus on controlling the discretion of capital
sentencers creates a false aura of rationality, even science, around
the necessarily moral task of deciding life or death.

[S]econd . . .the Court's constitutionalization of capital
punishment has diluted sentencing judges' and jurors' sense of ultimate responsibility for imposing the death penalty .... [W] hat
the Court's Eighth Amendment law forbids the prosecutor or
judge to tell a seated sentencing jury [under Caldwell] is exactly
what the law itself "tells" every potential juror. The Court's constitutionalization of capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment has necessarily entailed systematic federal review of all capital
cases and has prompted much greater state appellate review in order to preempt further constitutional challenges . . . .Yet this
"fact," of which we presume a large number of jurors are aware, is
no more "true" than is the prosecutor's argument in Caldwell; appellate courts do not generally review the moral appropriateness of
the imposition of the death penalty ....The Court's death penalty
law thus leaves sentencing judges and
juries with a false sense that
96
their power is safely circumscribed.

In short, the argument suggests, what makes death different is
that everybody passes the buck. 97 The Court seems to think that this is
acceptable-or at least that it is constitutional.
Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, in Tragic Choices,98 make a
similar point concerning the function of juries in general. They describe the jury as "aresponsible," and cite the jury's "lack of responsibility" as one of the reasons that "certain decisions are committed to
it."9 9 What they mean by aresponsibility, however, is a somewhat dif96. Id. at 433-35. Steiker and Steiker assume that Caldwell's plurality opinion is controlling. In fact, however, the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence allows the prosecutor or judge to tell the jury about the appellate process. See discussion supra Section l.B.
97. Rather than passing the buck (or getting it right), Charles Nesson proposes that
acceptability is the entire point ofjury decision making. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or
the Event? On JudicialProofand the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REv.1357 (1985). He
suggests that making us all feel like they got it right is the jury's goal. He explains,
When courts punish a defendant, we want to believe that he is in fact guilty of
committing the crime for which he stands convicted. We want to believe that all
of the elements of the crime actually occurred. "Why is A in prison for life? Because A stabbed B with an intent to kill B, and he succeeded." We need a belief
that the punishment is factually justified, a belief that will permit the courts, with
our approval, to impose sanctions without second thoughts. If we do not have
such a belief -if we regard the verdict as merely a bet on the probability that A
stabbed B- then we cannot feel secure about the imposition of punishment. Our
psychological need thus predisposes us to accept the verdict of guilt or liability as
a statement about the past event.
Id. at 1366-67. Such a theory could explain the Court's lack of concern for the lack ofjury
responsibility.
98. GuiDo CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBsrr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
99. Id. at 57.
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ferent sort of animal. Aresponsible agency, they suggest, is "representative, decentralized, and .. .gives no reasons for its decisions." 10 0

This description focuses more on the jury's lack of accountabilitythat is, its lack of an ongoing or outward focused responsibility for

what it has done. Certainly, juries are not held accountable for their
judgments and are aresponsible in that sense. Perhaps we can call this
an objective "aresponsibility." In contrast to Calabresi and Bobbitt,
Steicker and Steicker appear to be describing an "inconsequential"
sort of "aresponsibility," one that is inward focused and lasts only for
the duration of the trial-a responsibility for what the jury is doing.
Perhaps we can call this a subjective "aresponsibility." They suggest
that jurors believe, at least to some extent, that their actions are without consequence that they believe they are aresponsible because the responsibility lies elsewhere, in some supervising institution. Thus,
Steicker and Steicker often invoke the phrase "sense of responsibility,"
focusing on the jurors' own perceptions, while Calabresi and Bobbitt
rely heavily on the term "aresponsibility," which appears to be synonymous with "unaccountability."0 1)
Sherman Clark, in a recent article, suggests that juries "serve as a
means through which we as a community take responsibility for-own
up to-inherently problematic judgments [such as Calabresi and Bobbitt's tragic choices10 2] regarding the blameworthiness or culpability
of our fellow citizens."' 1 3 Although Clark describes his position as
"fundamentally at odds" with Calabresi and Bobbitt's, 0 4 they appear to
be talking about apples and oranges. Clark states, for example, that he
1 05
is "not arguing that jurors should be accountablefor their verdicts."
Instead, his position is that 'jurors ought to feel a sense of responsibility for judgments of culpability."' 1 6 Thus it appears that he has no
common ground upon which to disagree with Calabresi and
Bobbitt. 107
100.

Id

101.

See id. See also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 94 at 437.
See generally CALABRESI & BoBBITr, supra note 98.
Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381, 2381

102.

103.
(1999).
104. See id. at 2398.
105. Id. at 2399 (stating also that his "concern is with responsibility rather than
accountability").
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. But see id. at 2407 (arguing that Calabresi and Bobbitt, as well as George Priest,
view juries as "taking the sting out of difficult judgments," while Clark asserts, "to the contrary, that juries help keep the sting in difficultjudgments by ensuring that at least some of
us will be unable to avoid fixing responsibility on ourselves").
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Clark does appear to disagree with Steiker and Steiker, however.
10 8
They suggest that juries serve to diffuse personal responsibility.
Clark insists that juries ought to serve an opposing function. He concedes that it is "neither possible nor perhaps desirable for each member of the community to take personal responsibility for each act of
judgment,"'109 but, he asserts, "we can take turns."' 10 To Clark, what is
important in the role of the jury is that it accepts responsibility as a
surrogate of the community. Since Clark is describing what role juries
ought to play, rather than what role they do play, Steiker and Steiker
may actually agree with this assertion.
What these commentators fail to point out, however, is the most
important aspect of the jury's role in the death sentencing context:
guaranteeing a subjective, personal component to what otherwise
must be an impersonal administration of the law. Death is a different
kind of tragic choice. Juries do help the legal system with making difficult decisions, and juries should act as responsible surrogates for the
community. But what really counts in the death sentencing context is
holding people responsible for the death penalty decision. Utilizing a
sentencing body comprised of individuals with individual minds and
consciences and experiences, rather than some cold equation of law,
is precisely for the purpose of accentuating the grievousness of the
1 11
task.
Indeed, the essential role for the jury in capital sentencing is to
combat what Steiker and Steiker describe as the norms of death penalty jurisprudence: the cold, impersonal (and strictly objective) application of law as science, and the diluted feeling of responsibility that
generally accompanies such a process.' 12 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey described the role in the following manner:
In no other determination in the criminal law is the jury more truly
to act as the conscience of the community. In no other determination in the criminal law is it more important to make absolutely
of its accertain the jury is aware, not simply of the consequences
13
tions, but of its total responsibility for the judgment. 3

108. Id. at 2397.
109. Clark, supra note 103, at 2399.
110. Id. at 2399.
111. Seegenerally Mello, supra note 1. In some states, of course,judges rather than juries
are responsible for capital sentencing, with jurors playing an advisory role.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
113. New Jersey v. Rose, 548 A.2d 1058, 1087 (NJ. 1988).
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The court could easily have added, "in no other determination in
the criminal law is it more significant that the jury is made up of
people."
If we can agree that juries are unaccountable agencies, but contend that they are also responsible for an important part of the death
penalty decision-making process and that jurors therefore ought to
feel personally the weight of that responsibility, then we should embrace the Caldwell plurality opinion as a matter of sound policy. This
does not seem to get us any closer, however, to the conclusion that
such a policy is constitutionally mandated. Part II addresses that
challenge.
II.

Eighth Amendment Inadequacy

Although the Caldwell issue is a procedural one, 114 the Court's
analysis in Caldwell relies exclusively on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 1 5 rather than on the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
due process. Justice Marshall's opinion identifies the standard as "the
Eighth Amendment's heightened 'need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case.'"116 He explains, "[t]his Court has repeatedly said that under

the Eighth Amendment 'the qualitative difference of death from all
other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scru117
tiny of the capital sentencing determination.'"

114. Identifying the issue as procedural here is not intended to limit its scope to merely
the application of existing procedural rules. Instead, it is intended to imply that some
procedural rules must exist and that they must meet a minimum standard of propriety.
What makes the Caldwell issue a procedural one is that it concerns neither the determination of appropriateness of the death penalty in a specific context nor the determination of
general standards by which that appropriateness is measured. Rather, it concerns the qualifications of a decision-making body that can make such determinations. In this sense, it is a
procedural issue, and one that cannot be evaluated coherently by standards of cruelty or
unusualness.
The issue may also be characterized as what Gary Lawson calls a question of "process"
rather than one of "procedure" or "outcome." See Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and
Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. Riv. 313, 316
(1996).
115. The Court's only invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment is in the context of
incorporation of the Eighth Amendment against the state.
116. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,323 (1985) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
117. Id. (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)).
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Nothing in the text of the Eighth Amendment implicates judicial
scrutiny of the decision-making process in sentencing. 118 The text appears to contemplate no more than substantive review of sentencing
outcomes. How the source of this implied scrutiny of process can be a
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment is hopelessly incoherent. The tenuous connection between this kind of Eighth Amendment interpretation and the Eighth Amendment itself is what has led
Justice Scalia to bemoan "a whole new chapter in the 'death-is-different' jurisprudence which this Court is in the apparently continuous
11 9
process of composing."
That minimum procedural standards are required by the Constitution is not controversial. That compliance with these requirements
should be scrutinized carefully in death penalty cases is not surprising.
What is surprising (and ought to be controversial) is that the language
of the Eighth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth, would constitute the source of such requirements. What is it about "cruel" or "unusual" punishment that implicates process or procedural concerns?
A.

Furman v. Georgia

The Court's expanded reading of the Eighth Amendment began
in 1972 with Furman v. Georgia.I2 0 Furman is well known as the case
that put an end to executions in the United States (until Gregg v. Georgia'21 in 1976 allowed them to continue). In Furman, each Justice
wrote separately, and no single opinion was endorsed by a majority.
Justice Douglas's opinion concluded that "the death penalty . . .is

'unusual"' if it is applied discriminatorily.122 Justice Brennan's concurring opinion added that "[t]he probability of arbitrariness[in the death
penalty's application] is sufficiently substantial"' 23 to implicate the
Amendment. Justice White's concurrence explained that the death
penalty is cruel and unusual in an Eighth Amendment sense when it
becomes a "pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal
118. The text of the Eighth Amendment is very brief; it reads, "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Fourteenth Amendment states, "No State shall ... deprive
...
U.S. CONST.
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
amend. XIV.
119. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
121. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
122. Furman, 408 U.S. at 242. (Douglas, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added) See also id. at 309 (stating
"[tlhese death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual").
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contributions to any discernible social or public purposes."124 Justice
Marshall's concurring opinion concluded emphatically that "the
death penalty is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that violates
25
the Eighth Amendment."'
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger conceded "that the Constitution prohibits all punishments of extreme and barbarous cruelty, regardless of how frequently or infrequently imposed,"' 12 6 though it is
not entirely clear he was suggesting that the Eighth Amendment was
the source of this prohibition. Regarding the Eighth Amendment he
wrote:
The Eighth Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights to assure that certain types of punishments would never be imposed,
not to channelize the sentencing process. The approach of [the
concurring opinions of Justice Stewart and Justice White] has no
antecedent in the Eighth Amendment cases.127It is essentially and
exclusively a procedural due process argument.
How the Justices who made up the majority could apply the
Eighth Amendment to procedural issues was difficult for the dissent to
understand. But only a minority of the Justices held that the case implicated Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns, 28 though Justice Stewart stated that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freak29
ishly imposed.'
B.

Gregg v. Georgia

In Gregg, the Court continued to phrase procedural questions in
Eighth Amendment terminology. 130 Citing Powell v. Alabama, 3 ' the
Court commented on the "procedural" content of the Amendment,
stating that "[w] hen a defendant's life is at stake, the Court has been
124. Id at 312 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
128. See Brinkmann, supra note 7, at 362 ("[a]lthough some of the Justices discussed
the due process clause [in Furman], the common ground on which the opinions necessary
to support the judgment rested was the Eighth Amendment").
129. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
130. Terming the Eighth Amendment analysis an "inquiry into 'excessiveness,"' the
Court explained, "[f]irst, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain. Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (citations omitted).
131, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (requiring appointment of counsel on behalf of illiterate
youths in a capital case and limiting the holding to similar facts).
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particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is observed." 132 To
ensure that "the concerns expressed in Furman" are met, "that the
penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner," the Court held "that the sentencing authority [must be] given
adequate information and guidance," 133 although what information
and guidance are "adequate" in a given case is unclear. The Court
recommended bifurcated sentencing procedures and standards for
34
channeling the discretion of the sentencing body.1
Again, the Court failed to provide an explanation for reading
procedure into the terms "cruel" and "unusual." In a footnote, however, in a discussion of McGautha v. California,1 35 the Court states that
the Furman decision rested upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in addition to its Eighth Amendment grounding.1 3 6 Because Greggrelies heavily on Furman,1 3 7 this footnote actually
grounds the case in the Due Process Clause. Thus Gregg's requirements can be read to fall under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as
the Eighth.
C. McGautha v. California
Only twelve months before shaking up death penalty jurisprudence with its rendition of the Eighth Amendment in Furman, the
132. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187. Cf Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). In
Woodson, Justice Stewart wrote for a plurality of the Court, stating:
[T] he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a
100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in
the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
133. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
134. See id.
135. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
136. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 n.47. The Court states:
McGautha was not an Eighth Amendment decision, and to the extent it purported
to deal with Eighth Amendment concerns, it must be read in light of the opinions
in Furman v. Georgia. There the Court ruled that death sentences imposed under
statutes that left juries with untrammeled discretion to impose or withhold the
death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . . While
Furman did not overrule McGautha, it is clearly in substantial tension with a broad
reading of McGautha's holding ....[W]e adhere to Furman's determination that
where the ultimate punishment of death is at issue a system of standardless jury
discretion violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id Perhaps this footnote could even sustain a recasting of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence under the auspices of due process rather than cruel and unusual punishment.
137. See, e.g., id. at 188.
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Court declined the opportunity to reach a similar conclusion on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. In McGautha, the Court held that "no
constitutional infirmity" existed in sentencing schemes which "left to
the absolute discretion" ofjuries "the decision whether the defendant
should live or die."' 38 In coming to this conclusion, Justice Harlan's
majority opinion explained,
It may well be... that bifurcated trials and criteria for jury sentencing discretion are superior means of dealing with capital cases if
the death penalty is to be retained at all. But the Federal Constitution, which marks the limits of our authority in these cases, does
not guarantee trial procedures that are the best of all worlds, or
that accord with the most enlightened ideas of students of the
[then] infant science of criminology, or even those that measure
up to the individual predilections of members of this Court. The
Constitution requires no more than that trials be fairly conducted
and that 39
guaranteed rights of defendants be scrupulously
respected. 1
Though not "trials" in a technical sense, it is not a stretch to assume Justice Harlan's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment compels
1 40
a minimum standard of fairness in sentencing procedures as well.
Justice Douglas's dissent elaborates:
Some of ... (procedural due process's] requirements are explicit
in the Bill of Rights-a speedy trial, a trial by jury, the right to
counsel, the right to confrontation-all as made applicable to the
States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Other requirements of procedural due process are only implied,
not expressed; their inclusion or exclusion turns on the basic question of141fairness. In that category are notice and the right to be
heard.

The Justices all agree, the dissent contends, that not "any notice,
any procedure, any form of hearings, any type of trial prescribed by
any legislature would pass muster under procedural due process. 142
The disagreement on the Court, Justice. Douglas suggests, "relates to
what is essential for a fair trial, if the conventional, historic standards
of procedural due process are to apply."' 143 McGautha thus anticipates
that some guarantees of process in the Fourteenth Amendment will
138. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 185-86.
139. Id. at 221 (citations omitted).
140. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 12 (1994) ("It is settled that [the Due Process] Clause applies to the sentencing phase of capital trials."); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738, 746 (1990) ("[c]apital sentencing proceedings must of course satisfy the dictates
of the Due Process Clause").
141. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 235 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 235-36 n.14 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
143. Id.
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restrict death penalty sentencing and that some are implicit in the
promise of due process. If Caldwell had in its lineage McGautha (and
the Fourteenth Amendment) rather than Furman and Gregg (and the
Eighth), it might have fared better. In other words, had the Caldwell
Court decided that one of the implicit guarantees of process in the
Fourteenth Amendment were the provision of a sentencing body that
feels a sense of responsibility for imposing the death sentence (or at
least one that hasn't been encouraged to abdicate its responsibility),
then it might have created a lasting principle of death penalty
jurisprudence.
III.

The Right Constitutional Argument

If it is correct that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a minimum standard of fairness in sentencing procedures, as McGautha suggests, and if it is also correct that sentencing juries ought to have a
sense of the weight of their responsibility, as Part I of this Article suggests, the missing link in the constitutional compulsion of the Caldwell
holding (under the Fourteenth Amendment) is evidence that it is unfair to convince a jury it is acting "aresponsibly." The constitutionality
of the issue turns on whether it is "fundamentally fair" in a procedural
sense for a convicted criminal to face a death sentence even though
144
the sentencing body may feel little responsibility for its imposition.
Perhaps it is fair enough. After all, only those convicted of crimes serious enough to satisfy the Eighth Amendment's proportionality requirements face death sentences. Or perhaps the "scrupulous respect"
145
Justice Harlan referred to in McGautha requires more.
144. It is worth repeating that responsibility here means feeling responsible in a consequential sense-not accountability. See discussion supra Section I.C.
145. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 221. It is difficult to get too far with an "it just ain't fair"
argument though it will be tough to do much better as long as "fundamental fairness" is
the standard. By analogy, however, a compelling case can be made for the conclusion that
an objective standard of fairness requires the Caldwell outcome. A couple of situations,
somewhat similar to the dilemma presented by making Caldwelt-type statements before a
jury, are worth considering.
First, imagine a plaintiffs attorney in a tort case reassuring the jury that it need not
worry about awarding too high a figure in damages. For example, he might explain to the
jury the doctrine of remittitur, pointing out that the judge will correct any clear mistake
the jury might make, but reminding them that the judge cannot, at least not in federal
court (see STEPHEN C. YEAZEL, CIWL PROCEDURE 741 (4th ed. 1996)), increase the award if it
is too small. "There's no risk of going too high," the attorney might say, "but be sure not to
go too low." Or perhaps he would admonish the jury not to feel like they are the ones
putting the business under or its employees out of work, should they decide on a devastating figure. "You're just the first step in the process," he might tell them. "Jury awards are
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What Process Is Due?'

In Matthews v. Eldridge,146 the Court established a process for determining how much process is due. To implicate the "procedural"
Due Process Clause, the Court stated, "governmental decisions [must]
147 The
deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests ..
Court then laid out "three distinct factors" relevant to a procedural
due process inquiry:
lflirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
[s]econd, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
"..

regularly settled for well below their face value-just give us some leverage to bargain
with," he might say.
Surely this type of argument, even in a less egregious form, cannot be tolerated. Admittedly, it need not be the Constitution that prohibits it. A trial court's discretion is likely
prohibition enough. But the illustration does help to unpack what is unfair with Caldwell
type arguments: they make one choice (and not the other) easier to choose and easier to
live with. Thus, they are unfair. This is so when a prosecutor asks ajury to impose the death
penalty because the appellate courts will fix it if they get it wrong. And it is so when a
prosecutor merely suggests the jury not worry too much about the decision because the
appellate courts will review it-implying more or less the same thing.
Second, imagine a state that relies on a local polling service for sentencing-a telephone poll of a random sample of registered voters, say. There is no constitutional guarantee that ajury (or ajudge, for that matter) must perform a state's sentencing functions. A
poll certainly can be a "process" in the everyday meaning of the word. Procedural rules can
determine when the calls are made, how the sample is selected, how the questions are
phrased. Could such process be all that is "due"? Surely not.
This illustration also helps to unpack a Caldwell concern: that the sentencing decisionmaker ought to take very seriously the task at hand. The gravity of the death sentence
determination demands more than a reaction or offhand opinion. More than that is "due."
Due process, in sentencing procedures, cannot be just any process-just as a Sixth Amendment jury cannot be just anything a state calls a "jury." A Sixth Amendment jury must
consist of six jurors, at least (see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 223 (1978)); it requires
more than a 50-50 split to impose criminal sanctions (see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,
404-05 (1972)); and it must be impartial (see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1960)). This
much the Supreme Court has made clear. In a similar sense, it seems fair to conclude that
a sentencing body-especially in death penalty cases-must be a body that deliberates, that
reflects, that weighs factors (both aggravating and mitigating), and that has a sense of its
own responsibility. The terms "due process" suggest as much.
146. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Although Eldridge fell under the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process, the Court considered the same factors and proceeded with a very similar analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment in Lassiterv. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18
(1981).
Eldridge and Lassiter have received little attention in the Court's death penaltyjurisprudence, probably because of its insistence on invoking the Eighth Amendment in that context. But see Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1433 & 1433 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985) (analyzing
Lassiter in a death penalty case and citing Brinkmann, supra note 7).
147. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332. Presumably the Court did not just forget that "life" is also
protected by the Clause-it reads, "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added). More likely the Court considered it unnecessary to specifically mention that value.
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through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that 148
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
What is at stake in the weighing of these factors is what the Court
calls "the fundamental requirement of due process"-that is, "the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
49
manner."1
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,1 5 0 the Court elaborated
on the Eldridgeinquiry. In Lassiter,the Court explained that "'due pro51
cess' has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined."'
The Court continued,
[T] he phrase expresses the requirement of "fundamental fairness,"
a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance
is lofty. Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain
enterprise which must discover what "fundamental fairness" consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant
precedents
and then by assessing the several interests that are at
152
stake.
The Court also concluded that an individual's procedural rights
shrink as his "interest in personal liberty diminishes,"' 15 3 and it went
154
on to apply the factors from Eldridge.
B.

A Fair Decision-Maker

Had the Court decided Caldwell under procedural due process
doctrine rather than under Eighth Amendment auspices, the result
could very well have been a lasting principle of jury responsibility instead of the limited prohibition of misinformation it has become.
Such an analysis could have proceeded as follows: First, at stake was an
interest in life, the first and foremost of the interests protected by the
text of the Due Process Clause. The presence of an interest in life, as
148. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970))
(emphasis added).
149. Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). See a/soJerryL.
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Matthews
v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976); HenryJ.
Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
150. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
151. Id. at 24.
152. Id. at 24-25.
153. Id. at 26.
154. See id. at 27.
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with interests in liberty and property, implicates the Fourteenth
Amendment and triggers the Eldridge inquiry.
Second, the factors in the Eldridge inquiry militate towards heightened procedural safeguards. The inquiry's first factor, the private interest in life, could neither be more important nor more in jeopardy
than it is in capital sentencing proceedings. And just as an individual's
procedural rights shrink as his "interest in personal liberty diminishes," 155 so too, it seems fair to conclude, procedural rights must be

at their greatest when an individual's most important interest (his life)
is at stake.
The Eldridge inquiry's second factor, risk of error, also favors
heightened standards. Justice Marshall's plurality opinion in Caldwell
lists four ways in which a diminished sense of responsibility may bias
juries or otherwise lead to unreliable determinations. 156 It is not farfetched to think that a majority of the Court in 1985 (when Caldwell
was before it) and still today would consider the risk significant. Furthermore, the probable value of the proposed safeguard-prohibiting
Caldwell-type arguments before the jury-is also significant. At least, it
seems highly unlikely that a jury would assume its decision has little
consequence if a prosecutor is not telling it as much. 57 The solemnity
and austerity of the courtroom and death penalty proceedings themselves are ordinarily sufficient to convince ajury of the importance of
its role. This seems especially likely when coupled with instructions
from the judge. It is only when a jury is told that its work will be reviewed, and corrected if wrong, that concerns arise about the jury's
sense of its own role and responsibility.
Finally, the Eldridge inquiry's third factor, the government interest
in allowing responsibility-minimizing arguments, pales in comparison
to the defendant's personal interest. The government's interests in
easing the consciences of jury members and in securing more death
sentences by lowering the procedural bar simply cannot outweigh
what is at stake for the defendant. Moreover, countervailing government interests actually weigh against allowing CaldweU-type arguments
before juries. As Professor Clark suggests,' 58 one valuable characteristic ofjuries is that they act as a surrogate for the community in making
155. Id. at 26.
156. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330-33; See also discussion supra Section
I.B.3.
157. See LIflON & MITCHELL, supra note 13, at 138-56 (discussing capital jurors' feelings about their role).
158. See Clark, supra note 103, at 2381. See also discussion supra Section I.C. (discussing
Clark's position).
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difficult judgments, thus enabling the community to take responsibility for those judgments. The government has an interest in protecting
this aspect of the jury role. Additionally, the government has an interest in maintaining public confidence in the criminal justice system, a
confidence which may suffer when prosecutors secure death
sentences by inviting juries to pass the buck. In order to function effectively, the system must maintain a certain level of public confidence. 15 9 Criminal sanctions lose their deterrent effect if the public
has no confidence that the sanctions will be employed when the law is
broken. To the extent that Caldwell-type arguments become commonplace and well-known, they are potentially harmful to the government's interest in maintaining an effective criminal justice system.
Third, the basic due process right, the opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, is infringed upon to
the extent that a jury accepts a prosecutor's invitation to pass on its
responsibility (or a part thereof) to a reviewing court. Because judicial
review is by its very nature limited, 160 the defendant's opportunity to
be heard before the jury may be, in part, at the wrong time. And the
defendant's opportunity in front of the reviewing court may be, in
part, in a meaningless manner. That is, if the jury is deferring part of
its responsibility to a reviewing court, then part of the defendant's
opportunity to be heard should go with it. But procedural rules on
appeal are very different from those at trial. The defendant is not allowed to testify. Witnesses are not cross-examined. Indeed, nothing
but the cold record is examined. The appellate process simply is not
designed to provide the same opportunities as a trial. Worse yet, part
of the sentencing decision may be "passed on" by the jury but not
"picked up" by the judge or appellate court. A defendant, then, could
face a death sentence without ever having a full determination that
the sentence is appropriate. In such a case, the meaningful time and
manner-before the sentencing body at the time the sentencing decision is made-would be (in part) nonexistent.
In sum, the Caldwell Court could have held and indeed should
have held that the Due Process Clause's fundamental fairness requirement can be satisfied only with a fair decision-maker in the sentencing
process. Such a decision-maker can only be (a) one that appreciates
the import of the decision it is making and (b) one that makes that
159. See generally Nesson, supra note 97.
160. Even in states where juries only make death sentence recommendations to the
judge, substantial limitations exist on the judge's discretion to ignore that recommendation. See generally Mello, supra note 1.
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decision in full. In other words, a fair sentencing jury is one that feels
a sense of responsibility for its decision and does not pass on any part
of its responsibility to another decision-maker. It may not be practical
to guarantee that sentencing juries always accept the responsibility
that is theirs, but there is nothing difficult about preventing prosecutors from inviting them to abdicate that responsibility.
Conclusion
Although the Court is correct to backpedal away from imputing
procedural requirements into the language of the Eighth Amendment, it is unfaithful to the text of the Constitution to retreat from all
procedural requirements. Creative use of the Fourteenth Amendment
by prior Courts has led to what seems to be a reactionary suspicion, on
the part of current members of the Court, toward due process arguments-perhaps rightly so. But the made up "penumbras from emanations" should not cause the Court to lose sight of the textual
meaning of the words "due process of law." Some process must be
due.
It is too much to ask of executioners that they feel a personal
responsibility for the role they play in executions. Theirs is an ominous task, and one that may be impossible without the protections of
confidentiality and anonymity that are represented by the executioner's hood. But the jury's role in death sentencing is different. The
notion of hooding the jury is appalling. And it simply is not a big leap
from appalling to fundamentally unfair.

